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Getting the Numbers Right on China’s 
Actual Overseas Investment:
The Case of the Netherlands 
Piter DE JONG, Mark J. GREEVEN, and Haico EBBERS 
Abstract: This study assesses the quality of Chinese outbound FDI 
data. In our case study of the Netherlands, we checked the data qual-
ity of the often-used Orbis/Amadeus database and its data source, 
the Dutch Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel, KVK), 
which has one of the oldest and, arguably, one of the better databases 
within Europe. We analysed Chinese investments in the Netherlands 
and show that six adjustments are necessary to clean up the data. We 
also show that not making these adjustments can significantly impact 
the outcome of research. The cleaned-up data show that sampled 
Chinese firms are young, small, and private. 
 Manuscript received 30 November 2015; accepted 25 November 2016 
Keywords: China, Netherlands, Overseas Direct Investment, Data 
Quality 
Piter de Jong graduated from Nyenrode University (BBA) and Brad-
ford University (MBA). He has lived and worked in China for 18 
years. There, he was managing director of the Shanghai branch of 
ING Bank NV and has served as a board member/Shanghai chair-
man of the European Chamber of Commerce in China for six years. 
He recently joined the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs in The 
Hague and is currently a PhD candidate at Nyenrode University. 
E-mail: <piter.d.de.jong@gmail.com> 
 
Dr. Mark J. Greeven (corresponding author) graduated from Eras-
mus University, Rotterdam School of Management (PhD) and has 
been living and working in China since 2011. He is an associate pro-
fessor at the Management Science and Engineering Department of 
Zhejiang University, School of Management. Before moving to Chi-
na, he spent 3.5 years as an assistant professor at the Rotterdam 
School of Management. His research interests include innovation and 
entrepreneurship, and global R&D in, to, and from China. His work 
  188 Piter de Jong, Mark J. Greeven, and Haico Ebbers 

has been published in journals such as the Asia Pacific Journal of Man-
agement, European Management Journal, Telecommunications Policy, and Tech-
nology Analysis and Strategic Management. He published a case series on 
Alibaba and is currently writing a book on business ecosystems and 
Alibaba (Routledge, forthcoming 2017).  
E-mail: <mgreeven@gmail.com> 
 
Dr. Haico Ebbers is professor of International Economics at Nyen-
rode Business University in The Netherlands. He is guest professor at 
several national and international universities, including some top 
universities in China. He was visiting professor at the China Europe 
International Business School in Shanghai and is still active as visiting 
professor at Renmin University in Beijing and Sichuan University in 
Chengdu. In his latest publications, the focus is on China’s integra-
tion into the world economy, in particular its relationship with the 
European Union, through trade and investments. 
E-mail: <h.ebbers@nyenrode.nl> 
  China’s Actual Overseas Investment 189 

Introduction 
China has recently emerged as an economic power that is investing 
in, if not buying up, the developing and developed world (Nolan 
2012). For instance, the number of Chinese overseas acquisitions has 
more than doubled in the past five years and China’s outward foreign 
direct investments (OFDI) reached a record high of USD 103 billion 
in 2014, making it the world’s third-largest outward investor in that 
year. By the end of 2012, the accumulated OFDI that Chinese com-
panies such as Huawei, Haier, and Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC) had invested stood at USD 509 billion, ranking Chi-
na 13th in the world (UNCTAD 2012), sparking considerable aca-
demic debate on such topics as entry mode (Shaver 2013), motiva-
tions (Yiu, Lau, and Bruton 2007), and conditions (Peng, Wang, and 
Jiang 2008). Moreover, according to the media and professional con-
sulting reports, this trend is set to continue in the future. 
In line with the investment path theory of Dunning and Narula 
(2003), we can expect higher growth in OFDI compared with in-
bound FDI as China builds up more and more foreign assets. Initial-
ly, China’s overseas expansion was driven by state policy, which used 
loans to subsidise state-owned enterprises and help them secure a 
stable supply of natural resources (Yao and Sutherland 2009; Xiao 
and Sun 2005). However, privately-owned enterprises have more 
recently made headlines with M&A transactions in Europe as part of 
their search for technology, branding, and management know-how. 
This is driven by a further easing of application procedures for out-
ward FDI, the strong emphasis on international infrastructural pro-
jects (for instance, the Silk Road initiative), and the need to diversify 
China’s international investment position away from reserve assets. 
One issue when researching the topic of Chinese OFDI is the 
accuracy of the data available, especially when considering Chinese 
investments via offshore financial centres (Sutherland and Anderson 
2015), which affects data both at the firm level and the national level. 
The lack of detailed analyses on the size and significance of this phe-
nomenon may mislead research and the resulting insights. For ex-
ample, while the absolute amount of Chinese OFDI may seem to be 
very large, almost 70 per cent of it went to four offshore financial 
centres in 2012 and a significant proportion of these funds then 
flowed back into mainland China (Xiao 2004), rather than actually 
being invested overseas (Garcia-Herrero, Xia, and Casanova 2015). 
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This so called “round-tripping” seems to occur not only for tax rea-
sons, but also for the additional value that may be added, as some 
offshore centres enable firms to list on international capital markets 
(Sutherland and Matthews 2009). 
Nevertheless, many studies use data from leading databases that 
provide firm-level data, such as Orbis/Amadeus, for academic studies 
(see Zhang and Jiang 2013; Bas and Causa 2013; Javorcik and Spatar-
eanu 2008), without carefully analysing their structure and meaning. 
This lack of detailed analysis is worrying, as we must be clear about 
the significance of Chinese OFDI before we can set a relevant re-
search agenda. In this study, we will address four research questions. 
The first (RQ1) asks, “Is there a data problem when analysing Chi-
nese OFDI into the Netherlands, as a sample case for the rest of 
Europe?” The second research question (RQ2) queries, “What steps 
are necessary to address the data quality issues?” The third research 
question (RQ3) focuses on “What is the correct picture of OFDI in 
the Netherlands, after the data has been cleaned up?” The final re-
search question (RQ4) deals with “What is the impact of possible 
data quality issues?” 
In particular, we focus on the predominantly-used Orbis/Ama-
deus database, which as with all other databases sources its data on 
existing legal entities in the Netherlands from the Dutch Chamber of 
Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel, KVK), to analyse actual Chi-
nese investments in one European country: the Netherlands. China 
and the Netherlands have well-established economic ties dating back 
to 1729 when the Dutch United East India Company (Verenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) initiated direct trade with China (Liu 
2007). Trade between the Netherlands and China is still strong. In 
2013, based on bilateral trade, the Netherlands was China’s fourth 
largest trading partner in the EU after Germany, the UK and France 
(Hansakul and Levinger 2014). The Netherlands has been a signifi-
cant investor in China, ranking number two within the EU, in 2012 
and 2013, second only to Germany (MOFCOM 2013, 2014) and 
number four within the EU, in 2014 (MOFCOM 2015). In addition 
to having strong trade ties with China and being a significant investor 
in China, the Netherlands is also a recipient of large amounts of Chi-
nese OFDI compared to other EU countries. The Netherlands has a 
large number of registered Chinese companies, and it has recorded 
detailed data on investments in a well-established database since 
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1920. Overall, this study aims to clean up the raw data from various 
agencies, reports, and statistical databases to create a more detailed 
insight into Chinese OFDI. 
We start by providing background information on Chinese 
OFDI and the phenomenon of round-tripping in section two, fol-
lowed by a description of the methods and necessary steps for clean-
ing up data in section three. The next section then shows the results 
of the data clean-up, presenting a revised picture of Chinese OFDI 
into the Netherlands. Section five discusses the impact of issues with 
data quality using two examples, and the last section concludes with 
recommendations for further research. 
The Background of Chinese OFDI 
As can be seen from Figure 1, virtually no OFDI took place in the 
period prior to 1984 when overseas investment could only be under-
taken by Chinese state-owned foreign trade corporations with official 
political approval, mainly in the form of joint ventures. In 1985, Chi-
nese OFDI was only approximately USD 0.3 billion. From a Chinese 
government perspective, three stages in OFDI can be identified (Luo, 
Xue, and Han 2010) since 1984:  
 The first phase (1984–1990), focused mainly on gathering for-
eign exchange resources. In this stage, private enterprises were 
allowed to apply for permission to establish overseas subsidiar-
ies. Within these years, the volume of Chinese OFDI increased 
almost 10-fold to USD 2.7 billion.  
 In the second phase (1991–2000), FDI officially became a part 
of China’s national economic development plan and the Chinese 
government started to actively encourage Chinese OFDI in or-
der to explore overseas markets, increase the competitiveness of 
Chinese enterprises, and avoid foreign tariff barriers. Over 120 
state-owned enterprises, termed “global industry champions” by 
the Chinese government, accessed overseas investment pro-
grammes between 1991 and 1997. These companies included Si-
nopec, China Telecom, Lenovo, and Haier.  
 In the third phase (2001–present), the Chinese government 
strengthened its “Going abroad” policy (䎠ࠪ৫ᡈ⮕, zouchu qu 
zhanlüe), which aimed to acquire strategic assets (Deng 2009), 
further develop internationally competitive “global champion” 
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enterprises, secure resources abroad (Buckley et al. 2007), over-
come intensified competition and overcapacity in the domestic 
economy, acquire advanced technology to address competitive 
disadvantages (Child and Rodrigues 2005), and acquire brands 
and managerial know-how. More recently driven by the many 
failed ventures abroad and limited returns to the mainland econ-
omy, Beijing, in particular the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (ഭᇦཆ≷㇑⨶ተ, guojia waihui guanli ju, SAFE), now 
provides more guidance. The advice focuses not only on cheap 
assets (for instance, SAIC Motor Corporation Limited, TCL 
Corporation, and others), but increasingly on technology for 
domestic use, such as in the case of Geely Auto’s acquisition of 
Volvo, instead of only brand value. 
Figure 1. China’s Global FDI (in USD million) 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2015. 
In summary, we have seen a steep increase in OFDI from China 
while also observing, qualitatively, that the motivations of Chinese 
OFDI are multiple and have changed over recent decades. However, 
the aggregated data presented in Figure 1 cannot describe such 
changing motivations. In particular, these data do not show one par-
ticularly relevant phenomenon in Chinese OFDI, namely that a large 
proportion of capital is reinvested in mainland China (so-called 
“round-tripped capital”). As shown in Table 1, almost 70 per cent of 
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Chinese OFDI went to four offshore financial centres and a large 
proportion of this amount was reinvested in the mainland. Of the 
total Chinese OFDI of USD 531.9 billion, 57.6 per cent (or USD 
306.3 billion) went to Hong Kong, followed by the British Virgin 
Islands (5.8 per cent), the Cayman Islands (5.7 per cent), and Bermu-
da (0.6 per cent). 
Table 1. Top 10 Destinations for Chinese OFDI Stock in 2012  
No. Country/Region Stock in USD billion Percentage 
1 Hong Kong 306.372 57.6 
2 Virgin Islands   30.851   5.8 
3 Cayman Islands   30.072   5.7 
4 United States   17.080   3.2 
5 Australia   13.873   2.6 
6 Singapore   12.382   2.3 
7 Luxembourg     8.978   1.7 
8 United Kingdom     8.934   1.7 
9 Kazakhstan     6.251   1.2 
10 Canada     5.051   0.9 
Total World 531.900 100 
 European Union   31.538   5.9 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
2013. 
Note: The Statistics Bulletin indicates an OFDI amount of USD 531.9 billion, which is 
slightly more than the USD 509 billion presented in the UNCTAD data. 
Hence, a closer look at the disaggregated data shows a different pic-
ture of Chinese OFDI, suggesting that we need to go beyond aggre-
gate OFDI figures and investigate actual investments in order to 
ascertain a more accurate representation. For this purpose, we focus 
on a specific case example, namely the Netherlands. 
Methods
In order to answer the first research question regarding the existence 
of data quality issues and the second research question which ad-
dresses what possible steps might be taken to fix data quality issues, 
we focus on data problems in OFDI data in one of the oldest and 
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most reputable country-level database in Europe, the database of the 
Dutch Chamber of Commerce.  
Database and Country Selection 
We analysed the Orbis/Amadeus database operated by Bureau van 
Dijk, which is the world’s leading database for academic research. Its 
data cover 120 million listed and non-listed companies globally, and is 
mainly focused on legal entities in Europe (about 70 million compan-
ies). It uses Dutch Chamber of Commerce data as its source. It is 
widely used in academic studies in general (for example, a search for 
“Amadeus database” within Google Scholar yields 9,230 results, April 
2014). The Orbis/Amadeus database is also widely used in studies of 
Chinese OFDI. 
Chinese OFDI into Europe has grown significantly since 2006 
and in the Netherlands since 2010. Within Europe, the Netherlands 
ranked sixth in terms of OFDI stock and fourth in terms of OFDI 
flow, in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics and State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange 2013). In 2013 the Netherlands had the highest 
number of entities after Romania, Germany, and Italy with 402 main-
land Chinese companies registered, accounting for 5.9 per cent of the 
total. Please note that, after a data quality check, the actual number of 
registered mainland companies was found to be 333; however, as we 
did not perform similar data quality checks for the other EU coun-
tries, we continue to use the figure of 402 taken from Orbis/Ama-
deus in this discussion. 
Furthermore, the Netherlands has one of the most advanced and 
open information systems for collating company data in the EU. This 
system has recorded both limited and non-limited companies since 
1920. Within the EU-27, most trade registers are based on the Euro-
pean guideline 2009/101/EC, which covers only companies with 
limited liabilities. However, both limited and non-limited companies 
are included in the Netherlands’ company data system. In addition, 
the Netherlands has the most companies registered in the EU, after 
Italy, Spain, Germany, and France. However, data verification re-
quires local language skills, as much of the data to be analysed are 
only available in the local language. 
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Table 2. Top Seven European Countries in which Chinese-Owned Legal 
Entities are based 
Source: ORBIS/Amadeus database, July 2013. 
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Data Collection
The data for this research were collected from Orbis/Amadeus, the 
Dutch China Chamber of Commerce in the Netherlands (DCCC), 
the Kamer van Koophandel (KVK, the Dutch Chamber of Com-
merce, which provides Dutch company data for most other data-
bases), and general Internet searches. In the Netherlands, 592 legal 
entities are listed in Orbis/Amadeus with a global ultimate owner 
(GUO) in Greater China (402 from mainland China, 52 from Hong 
Kong, and 138 from Taiwan). In our study, we focused on Chinese 
firms from mainland China. All the data on these 402 companies 
were checked and verified. Data quality is important, as using Or-
bis/Amadeus database information without analysis on a company-
by-company basis may significantly affect the results of research.  
In this research, Chinese companies in the Netherlands are de-
fined as Dutch companies registered with KVK that have a GUO 
that is 50 per cent mainland Chinese. The choice to include 50 per 
cent owned entities, rather than 51 per cent owned entities with man-
agement control, in the dataset was deliberate. European companies 
in China often operate under 50/50 joint venture agreements with 
Chinese companies, and this is a common and acceptable way for 
Chinese firms to operate overseas. Therefore, companies with less 
than 50 per cent Chinese ownership were not considered. 
Data Checking Procedure and Sample Size  
Adjustments
We analysed every Chinese company in our sample using a variety of 
methods. First, the company data derived from the Orbis/Amadeus 
database were checked against those from the KVK and the DCCC. 
Both the KVK and the DCCC are formal organisations that register 
and record company-level information. This procedure led to the 
identification of inconsistencies that hampered an accurate descrip-
tion of a company’s situation. Therefore, in a second step, we 
checked the available public information on the companies, such as 
websites and news stories, which resulted in a revised, but still in-
complete, picture. Thirdly, we contacted those companies for which 
we still had inconsistent data. Lastly, we verified our company data 
with Dutch national and city-based governmental agencies based in 
China that are involved in attracting Chinese OFDI into the Nether-
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lands, and with experts from the authors’ academic networks. Based 
on this procedure, we are confident about the details of the presented 
dataset. 
However, this process identified a number of issues with the 
general database. In particular, we discovered the limitations of using 
information from data vendors without conducting further detailed 
analysis at the company level. In this regard, the triangulation of 
sources combined with industry insights and direct company-level 
analysis is warranted. Specifically, this four-step process suggested 
that six adjustments are essential when analysing these data. Most of 
these adjustments are unlikely to be specific to the Netherlands alone 
because five of the six issues refer to missing or incorrect China links 
in the Orbis/Amadeus database. The last reason – the prevalence of 
holding companies – may be specific to the Dutch case; however, 
data for other countries such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Ire-
land could reveal similar patterns. The issues are detailed, as follows: 
A Missing China Link 
For some companies, Orbis/Amadeus does not recognise the Chi-
nese shareholder, because the shareholder link to China is not includ-
ed in the KVK data (the source of the Orbis/Amadeus data). Some 
of these companies were acquired by Chinese companies, but the 
data had not been updated in the KVK database. Also, the Chinese 
parent company may not be visible because Virgin Islands entities are 
placed in the ownership chain directly from the Dutch-based subsidi-
ary to the mainland Chinese parent company (see the Ausnutria case 
study in the “Results” section as an example). We identified these 
companies by cross-checking data derived from KVK, Or-
bis/Amadeus, the DCCC list, public data from the Netherlands For-
eign Investment Agency, and Internet searches. Another 36 legal 
entities were, thus, identified as having Chinese ownership above 50 
per cent, making the total dataset 438 legal entities (402+36). 
An Erroneous China Link in Orbis/Amadeus 
By the same token, we also found that 114 Dutch legal entities on the 
Orbis/Amadeus database were marked as having mainland Chinese 
ownership, but actually had other ultimate ownerships, mainly Hong 
Kong or Taiwan. For example, Edimax Technology Europe BV’s 
ultimate parent, Edimax Technology Co. Ltd, is listed on the Or-
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bis/Amadeus database as mainland Chinese, but is in fact a Taiwan 
listed company. These 114 names were removed from the database, 
reducing the dataset to 324 legal entities (438–114). The wrong link 
issue is significant and underscores the importance of understanding 
the Chinese context. It may be the result of mapping issues or human 
error and deserves further research, not only in the KVK database, 
but also in other national chamber of commerce databases within 
Europe. 
An Erroneous Hong Kong Link in Orbis/Amadeus 
Furthermore, six entities (five Lenovo entities and Zhenhua) were 
listed in Orbis/Amadeus as Hong Kong-owned, even though the 
actual ultimate owner is based in mainland China. By adding these six 
entities, the dataset grew to 330 entities (324+6). 
Branches of Other Legal Entities 
We also located three Chinese companies that had opened an office 
in the Netherlands without establishing a separate legal entity. These 
companies are registered as the branch offices of non-Chinese GUO 
entities at KVK and do not appear in an Orbis/Amadeus search of 
Chinese companies in the Netherlands. These three companies are 
China Southern Airlines (Amsterdam Office), which employs 31 
people in Amsterdam; Air China Cargo Co. Ltd (nine staff); and Si-
notrans (Netherlands), which is a branch of Sinotrans (Germany) 
GmbH. The data on these companies were thus included, making the 
dataset grow to 333 entities (330+3). 
Misunderstandings about Ownership 
We found one example, outside the Orbis/Amadeus dataset, of a 
well-known Chinese company, Zoomlion (from Hunan, China, with 
30,000 staff and a world player in construction equipment), being 
registered with KVK as the Zoomlion European Service Center. 
However, despite the well-known Chinese name, this entity actually 
belongs to the Kranenbouw Group BV, which is a Dutch-owned 
dealership for Zoomlion for sales and repairs. 
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Holding Companies 
Although not a data quality issue, including holding companies in 
research on Chinese OFDI can lead to misleading conclusions about 
the actual activity of Chinese companies. For example, Huawei Tech-
nologies Cooperative U.A., the Dutch subsidiary of the large Chinese 
telecom company Huawei, is listed in Orbis/Amadeus as having a 
turnover of USD 13.98 billion and total assets of USD 12.85 billion, 
but only 21 employees. This entity is actually the holding company of 
several Huawei entities in Europe. The actual economic activity of 
Huawei in the Netherlands is represented by the Dutch subsidiary, 
Huawei Technologies Netherlands BV, which has a more modest 
turnover of USD 256.6 million with USD 173.1 million in total assets 
and 519 employees.  
While the database research was carried out in great depth by 
combining many different sources, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that some valid cases were still overlooked. In response to research 
question 1, we found that only 288 of the database-matched compan-
ies (402 minus the 114 identified in the section “An Erroneous China 
Link in Orbis/Amadeus” above) proved to be correct (in other 
words, 28 per cent of the data was incorrect). The Orbis/Amadeus 
database was unable to identify 45 (36+6+3) legal entities as Chinese-
owned because parent company information was not available or was 
“disguised.” Hence, 45 out of 333 cases, or 13.5 per cent, were not 
correctly identified using Orbis/Amadeus. 
These limitations are important for future researchers to consid-
er when interpreting analysis based on general databases. Further-
more, we found that 27 Chinese companies own several legal entities 
in the Netherlands. Thus, as of 23 July 2013, the actual number of 
mainland Chinese companies active in the country (regardless of how 
many legal entities they might have), with an equity stake of 50 per 
cent or above, was 268. It is interesting to note that, despite the regu-
lation that all companies in the Netherlands (except for branch of-
fices, of which there were three in our database) have to file at least 
balance sheet data, 130 of the 330 companies registered have not filed 
any such data. Moreover, of those 130 entities, only 10 legal entities 
have filed the required “403 declaration,” which states that the parent 
company is responsible for all the liabilities of its subsidiary. In sum, 
the six issues identified above cause a significant misrepresentation of 
the actual presence of Chinese companies in the Netherlands. In 
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response to research question 2, therefore, we have shown that six 
adjustments are necessary to clean up these data. 
The Results: Descriptive Findings and Case 
Study Example 
In this section, to respond to the third question about the true picture 
of Chinese OFDI in the Netherlands, we present our descriptive 
findings for mainland Chinese companies in the Netherlands based 
on the revised data derived from the clean-up process presented in 
the previous section. To confirm, the focus of this study is on the 333 
entities from mainland China identified above. We observed three 
main patterns in the data. The first pattern showed that the Chinese 
companies tend to be from the private sector, and that they are small 
and new in the Netherlands. Secondly, the Chinese companies tend 
to cluster in three regions, come predominantly from five Chinese 
cities, and centre on wholesale and trading. Finally, we observed that 
many large Chinese companies use tax-efficient structures, which is 
one advantage of Dutch policy that is currently under public scrutiny. 
To explain further, firstly, 75 per cent of the Chinese entities in 
our sample are private firms and only 25 per cent are state-owned. 
On average, these companies have been operating in the Netherlands 
for 7.3 years. In fact, 55 per cent have operated in the Netherlands 
for fewer than five years with almost 90 per cent having less than 15 
years’ presence in the country. However, this average number is in-
fluenced by the 12 entities with over 30 years of history that have 
been acquired by Chinese companies. If these 12 entities are removed 
from the sample, (mainland) Chinese operations in the Netherlands 
would be seen to be a relatively recent phenomenon. Furthermore, it 
is striking to see that 78 per cent of the firms employ fewer than five 
employees, with 41 per cent employing only one staff member. In 
summary, the sampled Chinese firms are young, small, and private. 
Secondly, we found regional and sectoral clustering in Chinese 
OFDI in the Netherlands. Around 50 per cent of the activities are 
located in the three largest cities of Rotterdam, Amsterdam (including 
Amstelveen, Schiphol, and Amsterdam Zuid-Oost), and The Hague. 
All these cities have a traditional overseas Chinese presence in the 
form of Chinatowns, indicating a cultural reason for such clustering. 
However, further communication with Dutch investment officials 
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suggests that this degree of large-city clustering is mostly related to 
the advantages of these locations in terms of logistics, access to fi-
nancial services, and active investment policy. Moreover, Rotterdam 
and Amsterdam have branches of two large Chinese banks: the Bank 
of China in Rotterdam and ICBC in Amsterdam. Interestingly, based 
on the KVK classification, 50 per cent of activities are in wholesale 
and trading, 16 per cent in financial services, 11 per cent in manufac-
turing, and eight per cent in professional scientific and technical ac-
tivities. Lastly, 60 per cent of these companies originate from five 
Chinese cities, namely Beijing, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and 
Wenzhou. 
Thirdly, of the 333 entities, 19 are incorporated as U.A. 
(Uitgesloten Aansprakelijkheid), a legal entity originally used by Dutch 
agricultural cooperatives, but in recent years mainly used as a tax-
planning tool to minimise tax liabilities, especially by large Chinese 
firms. The OECD’s efforts since the later years of the 1990s to com-
bat tax evasion and its Harmful Tax Practices initiative to identify tax 
havens, has been well researched (Elsayyad and Konrad 2012). Many 
updated treaties between OECD countries have significantly raised 
the probability of detecting tax evasion and greatly improving tax 
collection (OECD 2011). Against the background of the declining 
importance of classical tax havens, the findings on the tax optimisa-
tion options used in the Netherlands are of interest and may deserve 
further study. 
We illustrate our findings through a short case study on the in-
fant milk formula company, Ausnutria. The example of Ausnutria 
shows the difficulties of correctly identifying Chinese companies 
within the databases in the Netherlands. In October 2011, Ausnutria 
(based in Changsha, Hunan province) acquired the Hyproca Dairy 
Group, which has over 100 years of history in Holland (Hyproca was 
founded in 1897 in Ommen). Although this seems to be an obvious 
case of a Chinese company taking over a Dutch company, the Chi-
nese ownership of Hyproca does not show in any database (Or-
bis/Amadeus, KVK, and so on). The organisational chart given in 
Figure 2 shows why this is the case. 
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Figure 2. Organisational Structure of Ausnutria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ausnutria Dairy Corporation Ltd, n.d.: 102. 
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The “Company” refers to Ausnutria Dairy Corporation Ltd, which is 
a listed company in Hong Kong. This entity acquired a 51 per cent 
stake in Austria Hyproca BV, which was previously named Austria 
Hyproca Dairy Group BV and, according to the registration data, is 
also known as Hyproca Dairy Group. As the listed company, which 
has to disclose information, is majority controlled by Virgin Islands 
shareholders, its Chinese roots cannot be traced. Virgin Islands regis-
tered companies are not required to make public information about 
shareholders. This example shows the importance of correctly identi-
fying and linking the ownership in country-level databases. As 36 
companies were excluded from the KVK database due to this data 
issue, it has a significant impact on data quality and may affect the 
outcomes of research that relies on the database without first check-
ing or cleaning up the data.  
Discussion 
In this study, we assessed the quality and features of current Chinese 
OFDI data. In particular, we focused on the predominantly-used 
Orbis/Amadeus database and analysed actual Chinese investments in 
the Netherlands, but only after making six essential adjustments in 
order to increase the accuracy of the dataset used. Our research 
shows that the data on mainland Chinese companies available from 
public sources can be unreliable. In the present study, only after de-
tailed analysis at the firm level could a complete picture of Chinese 
OFDI in the Netherlands be obtained. In reply to the fourth research 
question regarding the impact of possible data quality issues, we show 
that the possible impact of data issues can be significant. Two specific 
examples from esteemed journals (with ABS ratings of 2 and 3) were 
analysed to show that it is likely that deficiencies in the Orbis/Ama-
deus data (caused by issues at the source, in other words, the KVK) 
may have affected the outcome of research: 
The first example concerns a study in the journal International 
Business Review (ABS ranking 3) of the productivity of foreign affiliates 
of emerging market multinationals (EMNEs) in Europe (Sanfilippo 
2015). The article uses the Orbis/Amadeus database, which included, 
at the time of analysis, 2,013 European affiliates of BRICS EMNEs. 
More than half of the foreign affiliates were reported as being located 
in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany. Chinese 
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affiliates accounted for about 17 per cent. Considering the import-
ance of the Netherlands in the database and the significant number of 
errors and omissions regarding Chinese firms in the source data, we 
believe that data issues may have had a significant impact on the re-
sults presented. Specifically, the article aimed to analyse mainland 
China as an emerging economy and part of the BRICS, so will have 
taken steps to exclude Taiwan from the database search. However, in 
line with our findings in the section “An Erroneous China Link in 
Orbis/Amadeus,” as many as 114 Taiwan firms would have remained 
in the sample (assuming that the research was conducted on the same 
date as this study). The inclusion of Taiwan companies (114 of the 
402 “Chinese companies” shown in Orbis/Amadeus in our study), 
which belong to a developed economy, in the sample may have over-
stated the level of productivity of “mainland Chinese companies” in 
the sample and thereby underestimated the productivity gap. 
The second example in the European Management Journal (ABS 
ranking 2) examines how EMNEs use OFDI in developed markets to 
secure knowledge spillovers to improve domestic technology capa-
bilities (Chen, Li, and Shapiro 2012). The article uses a panel dataset 
of 493 EMNE parent companies from 2000 to 2008. With 62 per 
cent of the EMNE parents in the database reported as investing in 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, the data from the Netherlands is significant to the study. The 
final emerging markets list in the study includes 57 economies, in-
cluding China and Taiwan, therefore the issue of finding “An Erro-
neous China Link in Orbis/Amadeus” will not have had an impact 
on data quality. However, the “Missing China Link” data issue identi-
fied in the current study would have excluded 36 affiliates of Chinese 
companies with intermediary parents in tax havens such as the Virgin 
Islands (assuming that the research was done on the same date as this 
study). These missing companies tend to be large Chinese state-own-
ed enterprises with significant R&D spending and should have been 
included in the article’s sample of knowledge-seeking entities. Thus, 
we believe that the omission of these SOEs due to problems with the 
data source may have affected the conclusions on the reverse spill-
over effects identified by Chen, Li, and Shapiro. 
 
 
  China’s Actual Overseas Investment 205 

Conclusion 
Based on our cleaned-up dataset, we found three patterns of Chinese 
OFDI in the Netherlands that warrant further investigation:  
 Chinese companies in the Netherlands tend to be private, small, 
and young;  
 they tend to cluster in three regions, come predominantly from 
five Chinese cities, and centre on wholesale and trading; and  
 many large Chinese companies use tax-efficient structures for 
their overseas investments. 
In an attempt to set a research agenda for future research on Chinese 
OFDI, we thus propose five directions. Firstly, as this paper has 
shown that data quality issues relating to Chinese OFDI may signifi-
cantly affect the outcome of any research that relies on database in-
formation, we suggest that further research into the data quality of 
other EU nations is needed, as similar data quality issues may exist in 
those databases. More accurate source data ultimately results in better 
quality research, which in turn supports better-founded policy ac-
tions. Secondly, future research needs to study not only large Chinese 
companies and headline investments, but also needs to focus on the 
small and relatively young Chinese companies that move abroad. Our 
findings on actual Chinese investment (RQ3) in the Netherlands 
show that the Chinese companies are small in terms of the number of 
employees, but it is unclear how they are managed after entry. How 
do they build up human resource capability? To what extent do they 
localise their labour force and integrate into the host environment? 
These are just a few of the questions that demand further study. 
Thirdly, further research is needed on how clusters, either in the 
home or in the host country, influence the process of internationali-
sation and location decision-making in Chinese OFDI. In particular, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that Chinese firms tend to follow each 
other and that their foreign-location decisions seem to be influenced 
by the decisions of other nearby firms in the home country. Fourthly, 
although much attention has been paid to Chinese OFDI in the natu-
ral resources and technology sectors, our study shows that traditional 
industries, such as wholesale and trading, warrant further investiga-
tion too. Finally, our research shows that the Netherlands is consid-
ered to be an attractive location for Chinese companies that are plan-
ning tax structures for overseas investments. This is a recent phe-
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nomenon, as we found that 14 of the 19 U.A. entities were set up 
after January 2010. As a result, the KVK data significantly overstate 
the actual investments of Chinese companies in the Netherlands. The 
assets held by these Chinese companies relate mainly to operations in 
other European countries rather than actual operational assets in the 
Netherlands. This insight also warrants further investigation to exam-
ine the effectiveness of related policy directives. 
The presented data analysis shows that only a few Chinese com-
panies have active operations in the Netherlands, suggesting that 
Chinese OFDI in Europe remains at an early stage. Given that per 
capita GDP in China is about USD 6,747 compared with USD 
34,060 in the EU and USD 53,101 in the United States (IMF 2013), 
the Chinese economy has much room to grow and thus the upward 
OFDI trend is bound to continue. Further research should, therefore, 
take into account the limitations in current databases and consider 
the six data adjustments highlighted in this study. Moreover, we sug-
gest that detailed firm-level analysis on actual Chinese investment is 
more relevant than the overall statistics. Considering the well-estab-
lished reputation and long history of the Dutch Chamber of Com-
merce (KVK) in collecting data, we imagine that similar data issues, 
or worse, may be present in other European country-level databases 
as well.  
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